The policy shift towards decentralisation promises important social change in rural India, providing as it does a three-tier system of local self-governments, the 
Introduction
Rural local governments in West Bengal, the Panchayats, have two related aims: The Gram Sabha is the general body of villagers of voting age operating alongside the Village Panchayat. It is the decision-making body at the local level. There is another forum of local democracy at the ward level: the Gram Sansad. Voters are members of both the Gram Sabha and the Gram Sansad. The Gram Sabha is expected to meet at least once every year to discuss issues related to the overall development of the 2 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Research Colloquium of the Commonwealth Local Government Conference, Bahamas, 10-14 May 2009 . The authors thank participants at the Colloquium for the discussion, anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments, and Soumyasubhra Guha for copyediting.
villages, while the Sansad is supposed to meet twice. It is expected that local participation will be channelled through regular meetings of the Gram Sabha and the Sansad. It is mandatory to notify all people in the village above eighteen years of age at least one week before these meetings. Ten percent of the villagers need to be present to make a quorum. If these meetings are not held, the activities of the Panchayat are not approved and a higher authority may suspend the Panchayat. Gram Sabha meetings provide an opportunity for common people to:
• Discuss, approve, disapprove, and prioritise future plans of action according to their felt needs • Identify and include people-in-need for poverty alleviation projects As well as acknowledging Gram Sabha as the foundation of Panchayati Raj system, the Government of West Bengal has made two further provisions (Planning Commission, 2009 government has been in power for more than 30 years, there needs to be a strengthened third tier. Further devolution of power through the village development councils will not necessarily mean a better system.
Methodology
As noted above we used a mixed-method approach to address different contexts viz.
Gram Sabha meetings and issues related to Gram Unnayan Samiti. The mixed-method was required to yield data that could uncover the essential dynamics of the two different contexts. We conducted audio recordings of the entire activities of 44 Gram Sabha meetings in the Birbhum district over a period of one year -without intervening in the free flowing events. After completion of the recordings, written transcripts were generated from the audio files and the essence of the discussions analysed. This led to an understanding of the broader contextual nature of people's voices within the development discourse. Following Giorgi (1970) we have used phenomenology to describe the essence of the meetings. In doing so, we drew on the work of Devanish (2002) and Schweitzer (2002) who discuss the inductive analysis of interview
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Village forums or development councils transcripts inspired by Giorgian phenomenological analysis. We have applied a relatively simple form of this analysis in three steps, which helped us generate essences that contextualise the discourses and map local issues within the larger context of people's participation in decision-making. The three steps were:
1. 'Thick description' of the meetings with minute details of the discussions, along with context references (see Geertz, 1973) 2. Coding, to identify themes of discussion and quantify themes 3. Integration of themes to discover the core issues in Gram Sabha meetings.
To study the effectiveness of the Gram Unnayan Samitis, ethnographic fieldwork was carried out in nineteen wards (that make up the Gram Unnayan Samiti) in the East Midnapore district. We interviewed and conducted group discussions with Panchayat officials, elected representatives and villagers. In each of the nineteen sansads there was one group discussion followed by individual interviews with various stakeholders.
We did not restrict our fieldwork to any defined sample of the number of people to be interacted with, because the aim of studying the Gram Unnayan Samitis was to expose the nature of the issues at grassroots level that related to their formation and functioning.
Context of West Bengal
The level of popular participation in community affairs is certainly one measure of the quality of democracy at the local level. One could conclude that the more people participate in decision-making, the more democratic is the system of the government (Parry and Moyser, 1984) . However, effective local democracy requires not only participation, but also that people's suggestions are reflected in policy outcomes (Saward, 1994) . Even extensive participation may yet fail to produce a decision outcome that is supported by the majority or (ideally) all of the involved stakeholders (Satterfield, [article under review] ). One of the dangers of decentralisation is that it may create 'pseudo-participation' and actually further empower local elites. For instance, during budget decision-making concerning water projects, each competing group could become defensive in terms of its own short-run goals instead of focusing on what is best for all (Rhoades 1999, p.339) . Bias in the distribution of benefits from rural development could also derive from the fact that "a (political) regime might
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As Bardhan and Mookherjee argue, problems derive from "weaknesses in the functioning of a fair electoral process at the local level, lower levels of political awareness of the poor, and the tendency for wealthier groups to form special interest groups" (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 34-35) . However, by reducing the cohesiveness of interest groups at the local level, and raising voter awareness and political competition, decentralization could be a beneficial process (Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999, 25-30) . But they warn that in districts of high inequality and poverty local institutions will be vulnerable to 'capture', either by political leaders or by local elites:
Economic corruption in a centralised system then tends to be replaced by political corruption (in the form of diversion of services to local elites), despite the fact that agents in either system behave in a self-interested fashion. (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 7) .
Local people thus become consigned to a limited set of roles and relations with regard to the use of resources, and little autonomy is created. Ajay Mehta, in his study of two villages in southern Rajasthan in India, stresses the political processes within the Panchayat that strengthen those who already have the power to "control and co-opt the poor to serve their interests" (Mehta 2000, 16) . In a study of the Indian state of Kerala, the authors state: "When a party dominates a Panchayat, it tends to reward its sympathizers exclusively," (Platteau and Gaspart 2003, 1697) Bengal. The present process, it seems, only aggravates the improper distribution of resources. Satadal Dasgupta (2001) argues that there has been polarisation of rural
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West Bengal into two major groups, the landed and the landless, and it is the class identities of these groups that leads to political conflict. Harry Blair's (2000) work shows the bias in distribution of benefits because the ruling party wanted to maintain the loyalty of certain farmers and rewarded only them. Bhattacharya (1999) shows how the peasant society is 'captured' by local party members, leading to skewed decision-making. The village poor who now abstain from going to the Gram Sabha meetings no longer see grassroots participation as an important avenue to control their own resources.
Findings from Gram Sabha meetings

Detailed analysis of transcripts brings out the following indicators of effectiveness of the Gram Sabha meetings:
People's participation 
Meeting duration
The idea of Gram Sabha is not only to bring people together but also to discuss local development plans in detail so that people's voices are reflected in both planning and implementation. The time it takes is important because plan approval, review of budget statements and social auditing are time-consuming tasks. However, our studied
Gram Sabhas took only on average 38 minutes to complete the meeting procedures.
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The shortest meeting of only 5 minutes took place in Karidya Village, whilst the longest was 112 minutes taken by Md. Bazar Village. We do not argue that the quality of meetings directly depends on the time taken, but the average length of Gram Sabhas appears insufficient to complete the expected tasks.
Nature of issues dealt with in Gram Sabha meetings
After initial coding of the recorded transcripts we have identified the various issues This formal way of giving approval indicates people's passiveness and reluctance to enter into discussion, and it is worth recalling that even this minimum space to raise people's voices is provided only in 9 per cent of cases. Another important agenda of Gram Sabha meetings is constructive discussion on planning and decision-making. To generate such a discussion, a careful presentation of the future plan is necessary, however, we found that in only 54.5 percent of the Gram Sabhas were planning and project proposals read. Further discussion of projects was alarmingly low.
Politicisation of Gram Sabha meetings
Gram Sabhas are meant to be the common people's arena and, ideally, the nature of discussion and involvement of people in planning and decision-making should be impartial and apolitical. However, the transcript analysis revealed that in about 23 per cent of the Gram Sabhas a political speech was delivered. These discourses address three kinds of issues: the long history of success of the ruling party; blaming political differences between Block and Village Panchayats for failure; and comparative stories of success and failure where a changeover in the political party has taken place. It is In Haridaspur, a local political leader was invited to deliver a long speech which took away time from the people's discussion. In Dhakalbati a comparative account was presented to show the better performance by the newly formed board. The conversation suggests that apart from the last request, which was already known to the Village Panchayat, others are ignored. Phenomenological transcript analysis thus uncovers two related issues: first, the failure of the participatory agenda due to people's reluctance to become engaged in discussion; and second, ignoring or suppressing people's voices. Since the number of participants is alarmingly low in the first place, any voice suppression will have a considerable additional adverse effect on the participatory agenda. Thus, lack of opportunity for people to raise their voices, the formalised approval process for proposals put forward by the Panchayat, and meeting politicisation are all possible reasons for the reluctance of people to participate. It is for these reasons that the local government department has tried to promote Village Development Councils, the Gram Unnayan Samitis.
In the 25 years tenure of Left Front this is the first time in… that there is no
Village development councils: Organised effort to empower people?
A brief glance at the organisational structure of Gram Unnayan Samiti (GUS) reflects an intention to promote people's participation from all sectors, including the different political parties. In this section, we analyse the functioning of a council in East • Economic gain (73 out of 81 GUS members).
• Space to strengthen an existing political base (69 out of 81) 3 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/transforming-rural-livelihoods-india.pdf
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• Space to exercise power as an individual and as a member of a specific political party (33 out of 81 GUS members).
Every village reported the phenomenon of 'panel placement' by party members for the GUS. When the local government secretary (ie. the presiding officer) sought nominees for the reserved and unreserved positions, two panels were put forward by the ruling and opposition parties respectively. Their supporters then aligned themselves accordingly to make the voting process easier. This process indicates that the GUS is becoming another political entity and not a common people's arena. Fourteen out of nineteen village areas studied formed their GUS in this way. Four GUSs are yet to be formed as endeavours to do so failed due to the low rate of participation and political conflict. In another case, the outcome is subject to a court ruling and the GUS is inactive. It is also noteworthy that because of these problems, the Government of West
Bengal is not imposing the mandatory formation of GUSs.
Political conflicts: the GUS battleground
As noted above, the evidence indicates that a number of GUSs have become politicised before, during and after their formation, and effectively used as a tool to appropriate political interests. Controlling the GUS seems to have become a preoccupation of the political parties. In two regions, villagers were threatened by the defeated party not to attend the Gram Sansad meeting where people were to be nominated for appointment to the GUS. In these two Gram Sansads, a quorum was not attained on the first day and the meeting adjourned. On the next day, the winning party urged villagers to attend and assured their safety and asked for their vote. This resulted in a one-party GUS. In another case, the defeated party brought supporters from outside the village to increase the number of votes. The winning party reciprocated and hence the place became a 'battlefield' between the two groups and the meeting was cancelled. Several months later the 'blame-game' around these events is continuing. The question of 'who did it first' became more important than the formation of the GUS. In another village, political conflict went so far that the meeting had to be adjourned and police called to escort local government officials to safety. A new level of conflict was attained in another case, mentioned earlier, where the GUS was established but then its legitimacy challenged in the district court. In the said village, nominations for the GUS were dominated by the party that lost the Panchayat election, but which had previously ruled the ward for more than two decades. The winning party challenged the legitimacy of the GUS on the grounds that villagers had 
The villagers argue:
It is hampering our daily lives -after that meeting we all know who is from which side! I know who is with me and who is against me. I am afraid about
Motivation of GUS members
We enquired about people's motivation to participate in the GUS, and present the results in Table 1 : Seen as a new opportunity for employment 11 13.6
Motivation
Feeling lonely after retirement 6 7.4
TOTAL 81 100
The table shows that party pressure plays a major role. Most members agree that their entry to politics is through the GUS, which is seen a step to learn and then get involved with the Village Panchayat. A threefold incentive for working voluntarily as a GUS member emerges: power, money and prestige. 
Impacts on programmes
The formation of a GUS is the first step in continuing existing programmes and initiating new ones however political conflict clearly creates obstacles in programme implementation. There are instances, for example, of political opponents denying access to land needed to create work under the recently implemented rural employment guarantee schemes. In another case, the social forestry programme was severely affected by the destructive attitude of opponents who uprooted saplings and destroyed the protective fences around the plants. Elsewhere, almost twice as many labourers as were really needed were given work on a rural employment project because both the dominant and opposition groups within the GUS sent their respective supporters.
Core findings from the two contexts
The study reveals numerous localised issues that reflect two larger domains: first, the unintended politicisation of the democratic space; and second, people's passiveness. In the following sections, we discuss these core issues, their dimensions and their impact on local government.
Unintended politicisation of the democratic space
The primary issue related to the failure of the participatory agendas of both Gram Sabhas and GUSs is unintended politicisation. In Gram Sabha meetings, political agendas are created and presented through delivered speeches, while in case of the GUS, politicisation starts from the period of GUS formation as it is viewed as a space to exercise political control. In both cases the formal mechanism has been subverted by informal party political activity. The political process of decision-making is of course important and could play a productive role if large-scale people's participation is ensured -the original agenda of the Panchayat system. However, the poor rate of participation in Gram Sabhas, and problems with GUS formation reveal a detrimental political atmosphere in the villages. A significant factor is people's fear of being show that the core political incentive at work is to 'steer benefits'. People are left with no option but to choose from alternatives that are 'structured' by the different political parties.
People's passiveness
Political interference in democratic space is evidenced in both contexts, but people are often found to remain passive and detached even though this detachment is not in their best interests. Why do people remain passive? It is largely a result of the failure of collective mobilisation. A situation in which 'facts' speak out unmistakably for or against a definite course of action. Georg Lukács' argument is worth remembering here: "A situation in which 'facts' speak out unmistakably for or against a definite course of action has never existed, and neither can or will exist" (Lukác 1972, 23) .
CHATTOPADHYAY, CHAKRABARTI & NATH: Village forums or development councils
Therefore there is little possibility of change until some concerted effort is made to work towards organising people against their passiveness.
Conclusion
Our study supports previous work by Bardhan and Mukherjee (1999) Finally, it is important to understand that change through these endeavours will take time. A major problem with policies for development and participation is that they are initiated rapidly, frequently without proper social infrastructure. As a result, they fail and sometimes create long-term detrimental effects. It must be appreciated that these initiatives are aimed at cultural change -to make people active, participatory and less path-dependent in a society with a long legacy of division and polarisation. The endeavour should be slow and steady and should build on current arrangements in a culturally sensitive way to bring about long-term and sustainable change towards collective benefits.
